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Political arrangements for Caribbean security might be set up in the following steps:

a. At end of phase 2, Security Council meets to hear the report of the Secretary General on his attempt to verify dismantling and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.

b. At same meeting USSR makes unilateral declaration that it will not put offensive weapons into Cuba (or Western Hemisphere) again.

c. At the same meeting Cuba declares its intention not to import offensive weapons.

d. At the same meeting, United States declares the conditions under which it will refrain from invading Cuba - along lines already announced by President at press conferences and in letters to Khrushchev.

e. At the same meeting, Security Council notes that Caribbean nations all wish to establish international security arrangements that would require some continuing inspection machinery.

f. Security Council, taking note of all these declaration of intentions, then authorizes the Secretary General to work with the Caribbean nations as a group in establishing a Special Representative of the Secretary

General

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY [Signature] DATE 4-6-88

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General with necessary staff to provide a continuing presence to make sure that all the declarations of intent are adhered to.

g. The resolution might contain, in addition, a general exhortation to UN members to mold their behavior in accordance with the arrangements rehearsed in the several declarations. (Similar provisions were included in several of the Congo resolutions, both in the Security Council and the General Assembly.)

The entire enterprise would be conducted under the semantic flag of "Keeping the Cold War Out of the Caribbean".

The advantage of this kind of arrangement would be that there is no automatic need for the Security Council to receive reports, review arrangements, or otherwise enable Soviets to meddle in the Caribbean. The Soviet Union could always call for a Security Council meeting if they thought there was a threat to the peace in the Caribbean, but this ~~it can~~ ⁱⁿ always do. /The above arrangement, in other words, there is no part of the continuing Caribbean security program that requires any further authorization or action by the Security Council. To the extent that financial or administrative problems of the Caribbean arrangement required legislation by a UN organ, such problems would come up to the General Assembly through the Fifth Committee in the usual way.